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Introduction
On March 20, 1980, the United Kingdom enacted legislation designed to
"provide protection from requirements, prohibitions, and judgments
imposed or given under the laws of countries outside the United Kingdom
and affecting the trading or other interests of persons in the United King-
dom."' The Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 (Trading Interests
Act) represents an attempt by the British government to shield its citizens
and their economic interests from the extraterritorial reach of the United
States antitrust laws.2 The dispute between the British and American gov-
ernments over the proper reach of antitrust laws is not of recent origin; in
fact, it has continued uninterrupted for thirty-five years.3 The United
States view of jurisdiction in the antitrust area has been the cause of diplo-
matic protests,4 international disputes, 5 intense criticism 6 and even protec-
* Mr. Rosen is a law student at Georgetown University.
'Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 187, Preamble [hereinafter cited as Trading
Interests Act].
2972 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533 (1979).
'The dispute began in 1945 with United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945). See notes 19 to 21 & accompanying text infra.
'Since 1945 at least nineteen other foreign governments have protested American assertions
ofjurisdiction in international antitrust cases. See, e.g., Remarks of Donald L. Flexner (Dep-
uty Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division), Foreign Discovery and U.S. Antitrust
Policy-The Conflict Resolving Mechanisms, before the 1978 Fordharm Corporate Law Insti-
tute (Nov. 15, 1978); A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 365-72 (2d ed. 1970);
Haight, Extracts from Some Published Material on Official Protests, Directives, Prohibitions,
Comments, etc. in REPORT OF THE 51ST INTERNATIONAL LAW Assoc. CONFERENCE 565-92
(1964); SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST LAWS AND FOREIGN TRADE OF THE ASSOCIA-
TION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN
THE APPLICATION OF AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAWS TO COMMERCE WITH FOREIGN NATIONS
12-18 (1957).
'See, e.g., Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Rio Algom Corporation, No. 76-C-3830,
(N.D. Ill., filed Oct. 15, 1976) notes 64 to 76 & accompanying text.
6See, e.g., Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33
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tive legislation by foreign governments. 7 However, the Trading Interests
Act represents an escalation to a new level of battle: retaliatory legislation.
8
The Trading Interests Act includes a "claw-back" provision, a sweeping
new measure that allows a British citizen, a British corporation or a "person
carrying on business in the United Kingdom" 9 to recover back in the Brit-
ish courts from a winning opponent in a foreign court any noncompensa-
tory damages awarded by that foreign court.' 0 The consequences of this
measure could make it impossible, in practice, for any multinational corpo-
ration to recover a treble damage judgment in the United States against
another multinational corporation that has assets in the United Kingdom. ' I
Many scholars feel this could severely damage the effectiveness of United
States antitrust laws. 12 Other provisions in the Act potentially could have
an equally damaging effect on antitrust litigation. 13
This article first will outline the applicable jurisdictional doctrine, the
Alcoa test,14 and the alleged conflict between that doctrine and some basic
principles of international law. A chronological study of the United States-
United Kingdom legislative and judicial confrontations over the extraterri-
torial application of United States antitrust law will follow. Third, the
Trading Interests Act will be analyzed with regard to international law and
comity principles. Finally, this article will discuss the importance of the Act
in light of recent developments in the extraterritorial application of anti-
trust laws.
I. The Conflict over Extraterritorial Reach:
United States Antitrust Law
In 1890, the United States Congress passed an act "to protect trade and
commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies."1 5 Section one of
the act states: "Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 146 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Jennings]; Harvard Research in Interna-
tional Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 466-74 (Supp. 1935)
[hereinafter cited as Harvard Research'].
'See, e.g., Foreign Antitrust Judgements (Restriction of Enforcement) Act 1979, No. 13,
Austl. Acts.
'See, e.g., Swiss Federal Bank Act, art. 47 (1974).
'Trading Interests Act, supra note I, § 6(I)(c).
'Old
"Assuming the defendant in the United States action does business in the United Kingdom.
Note, however, that under section six of the Trading Interests Act, note I supra, the plaintiff
corporation could still recover in the United States court and keep the one-third compensatory
portion of the damage award.
"See, e.g., Gordon, Extraterritorial Application of United States Economic Laws, Britain
Draws the Line, 14 INT'L LAW. 151 (1980).
"For example, section 5, a "nonenforcement" provision, prohibits courts in Great Britain
from enforcing foreign antitrust judgments in the United Kingdom. Trading Interests Act,
supra note 1, § 5.
'See notes 19 to 2 i, infra and accompanying text, for an explanation of the Alcoa doctrine.
"Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations" is declared illegal, and every person making such an arrangement
is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by fines, imprisonment, or both. 16
That Act, labelled the Sherman Antitrust Act, was supplemented in 1914 by
the Federal Trade Commission' 7 and Clayton' 8 Acts. These three statutes
provide the framework for United States antitrust policy.
In 1945, the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, applied
United States antitrust laws to international disputes in UnitedStates v. Alu-
minum Co. of America' 9 (the Alcoa case). Judge Learned Hand stated:
It is settled law ... that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not
within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordi-
narily recognize.
20
This doctrine became known as the "effects" or "intended effects" doctrine,
and it has guided United States courts in the area of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion for the last thirty-five years.2 '
II. Principles of International Law
International law recognizes the right of a nation to apply its laws extra-
territorially to conduct which is "inimical to the public interest" and which
has been denounced by that nation as "criminal. '22 According to the
United States Supreme Court, the test of whether a law is "criminal" or
"penal," as opposed to "civil," is "whether the wrong sought to be redressed
is a wrong to the public, or a wrong to the individual .... -23 Thus, the
Sherman Act, in the eyes of the United States government, is a "penal"
statute in the international law sense,24 even though the availability of equi-
table relief results in the statute being called "civil" for purposes of domes-
tic antitrust law.2 5
In order to justify an extraterritorial application of its laws, a nation must
161d
"Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1976).
"Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976).
"1148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). Judge Hand ruled that Aluminum Limited, a Canadian cor-
poration, violated the Sherman Act in forming, along with other corporations, including the
Aluminum Company of America, an international cartel. He held that the effects were felt in
the United States and that that was sufficient to make the cartel violative of the United States
antitrust laws.
2°Id at 443.
"In 1975 the Supreme Court clarified the explanation of the "intended effects" doctrine in
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The Court
noted that intent is necessary; however, it may be presumed from the natural consequences of
the defendant's actions.
22See Jennings, supra note 6, at 146-48; Harvard Research, supra note 6 at 466-74.
'Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892).
'See E. Kintner & J. Griffin, Antitrust Jurisdiction over Foreign Commerce, 18 B.C. INDUS.
& COM. L. REV. 199, 220 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Kintner & Griffin].
25Id
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have some interest in the activity that is being regulated. 26 This interest is
recognized when a nation's citizen has committed the offense, 27 when a
nation's national interest is injured by the bffense, 28 when the nation has
custody of the person committing the offense and the offense is one which is
generally condemned, 29 and when the citizen of a nation is injured by the
offense. 30 In addition, some governments, including the United States and
Great Britain, recognize that a nation may assert jurisdiction when any con-
stituent element of the offense is consummated within that state.3 1
In numerous treatises, legal scholars discuss the principle, termed the
"objective" territorial approach, and they defend it almost unanimously. 32
However, the scholars disagree on the question of how far "objective" terri-
toriality may be extended in the field of economic regulation. Critics of the
Alcoa "intended effects" test argue that jurisdiction can only be asserted
when the effects are direct and physical, such as in homicide cases. They
claim that the effects of economic crimes are too remote and too difficult to
establish to provide an appropriate basis for jurisdiction.33 The universal-
ity of condemnation of manslaughter makes the extraterritorial application
of a state's legislation acceptable in a murder case. But the extraterritorial
2 6 1d
2"See, e.g., Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 381 (1948); Siriotes v. Florida, 313
U.S. 69, 73 (1931); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-38 (1932).
28See, e.g., United States v. Rodriquez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 489-90 (S.D. Cal. 1960), aff'dsub
nom. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 553 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948
(1961).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 192-95 (1820); United States v.
Holmes, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 412, 416-17 (1820).
30U.S. DEP'T OF STATE REPORT ON EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIME AND THE CUTTING CASE 57
(1887) (cited in Kintner & Griffin, supra note 24 at 220).
"See, e.g., Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
"See, e.g., A.D. NEALE, ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 360-72 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as NEALE]; Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145 (1973);
W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (2d ed. 1973). R.Y. Jennings, a
leading British scholar in the field of antitrust jurisdiction, has noted that "the objective appli-
cation [of the territorial principle] has been adopted into general jurisprudence." Jennings,
supra note 6 at 156.
13See, e.g., Jennings, supra note 6 at 175:
The objective application of the territorial principle is certainly now part of the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and there seems to be no good reason why
it should not be used in the enforcement of antitrust laws. The United States courts cannot
be expected to refuse jurisdiction over agreements which primarily intend, and produce,
illegal activities within United States territory. But it may, with respect, be submitted that
the Alcoa pattern of case goes too far when "jurisdiction" is assumed over foreigners' for-
eign agreements, merely because it has been possible to allege some "effects" on United
States imports or exports, and because the agreement would have been illegal if made in the
United States. This kind of jurisdiction seems to offend in two ways. First, since this juris-
diction is rested by the court on the objective test of territorial jurisdiction, it must be kept
within the confines of that concept. But to extend that concept to cover effects in the sense of
mere repercussions--sometimes repercussions ancillary to the purpose of the scheme as in
the ,4coa case-is not only to extend it beyond the limits covered by authority but also to
reduce it to an absurdity. Practically unlimited extraterritorial jurisdiction cannot reason-
ably be found on a territorial principle. Secondly, even allowing a most liberal view of the
limits of extraterritorial jurisdiction, these cases still offend against the ultimate limit
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application of less universally recognized laws to promote competition is
more open to question. Advocates of the "effects" doctrine indicate, on the
other hand, that because most states have some sort of rules against unfair
competition or economic coercion, an extraterritorial application should be
acceptable. Thus, the international legal rule with regard to the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction in the antitrust area is, at the least, unclear.
A. Criticism of Extraterritoriality
The British are the strongest and loudest critics of the "effects" doctrine.
One commentator summarized the British objection to the United States
view of extraterritorial jurisdiction as follows:
international law will permit a State to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction pro-
vided that State's legitimate interests (legitimate that is to say by tests accepted in
the common practice of States) are involved; but against this must be set also the
legitimate and reasonable interests of the State whose territory is primarily con-
cerned, for the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction must not be permitted to
extend to the point when the local law is supplanted; where in fact it becomes an
interference by one State in the affairs of another. . . . A state has a right to
extraterritorial jurisdiction where its legitimate interests are concerned, but the
right may be abused, and it is abused when it becomes essentially an interference
with the exercise of the local territorial jurisdiction. 34
In the antitrust area, the British have found the United States view "partic-
ularly objectionable. '35 The British feel, as do many other governments, 36
that:
(1) The formation of a cartel and other activities against which antitrust legis-
lation is directed are not universally recognized as unlawful. Offences in the anti-
trust category are wholly different from such offences as piracy which are
universally regarded as unlawful.
(2) The assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust matters represents
an extension of the economic policy of one state which is likely to conflict with
that of other states. .... 37
B. The Timberlane and Mannington Mills Cases
In 1976, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to mitigate foreign
objections to the extraterritorial reach of the United States antitrust laws.
because they are an attempt to export into other countries and to make operate there what
are after all peculiarly American political notions.
See also Henry, The United States Antitrust Laws: A Canadian Viewpoint, 8 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L.
259 (1970); Raymond, A New Look at the Jurisdiction in Alcoa, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 558 (1967);
Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J.
639 (1954).
4Jennings, supra note 6, at 153.
"Amicus Curiae Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland at 22, Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Rio Algom Corp., 953 ANTITRUST AND
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-5 (Feb. 28, 1980) [hereinafter cited as British Government Brief].3
'See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Memorandum of the Government of Australia, Rio Algom Cor-
poration v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir., 1980).
"British Government Brief, supra note 35 at 25.
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In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,38 the court of appeals
seemed to curtail severely the reach of the "effects" doctrine. "The effects
test by itself is incomplete because it fails to consider other nations inter-
ests. . . .What we prefer is an evaluation and balancing of the relevant
considerations in each case, . . . a 'jurisdictional rule of reason'. 39
In 1979, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals followed the Timberlane
approach of applying a conffict-of-laws analysis to the jurisdictional ques-
tion. In Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,4° the court used a two-
pronged test. First, it applied the Alcoa "effects" doctrine to determine
whether subject matter jurisdiction existed. Then it used the Timberlane
"rule of reason" test to determine whether such jurisdiction should be exer-
cised.4'
The considerations set out in Manningon Mills provide the framework
for a comparative relations test. First, Mannington Mills suggests that
courts determine which state has the preponderant interest in having its law
apply to the conduct in question. 42 Second, the nationality of the defendant
is an important consideration.4 3 A third Mannington Mills consideration
would favor declining jurisdiction where a foreign State is being sued for
anticompetitive conduct.44 Fourth, Manningon Mills suggests that courts
consider the possibilities for effective enforcement of a prospective judg-
ment before asserting antitrust subject matter jurisdiction in the interna-
tional context.4 5 A fifth consideration is whether an order under the
relevant circumstances would be acceptable in the United States if made by
the foreign nation.4 6 Finally, Mannington Mills suggests that the courts
inquire whether a treaty exists which addresses the antitrust issue before
asserting jurisdiction.4 7 However, to announce the demise of the Alcoa
doctrine would be premature. As will be discussed shortly, in Westinghouse
Electric Corporation v. Rio Algom Corp.48 the Alcoa doctrine was rein-
carnated under the guise of a "balancing" test.49
Il1. The United States-United Kingdom Dispute
The dispute between the United States and Great Britian over the prob-
lem of antitrust jurisdiction started soon after the Alcoa decision. In 1952,
"the high-water mark of jurisdictional claims" 50 may have been reached in
38549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
391d at 611-12.









"No. 76-C-3940 (N.D. IU., filed Oct. 15, 1976).
"'See notes 64-76 & accompanying text infra.
'?Jennings, supra note 6 at 167.
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United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries.51 In that case, a United
States federal court directed a British corporation to refrain from asserting
its British patents against any American manufacturer that has made prod-
ucts under American patents. The "effects" doctrine clearly was applied
here since the United States court was instructing a foreign corporation on
how to utilize its own property in its own country. In addition, this decree
included a provision ordering Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) to reas-
sign to du Pont, an American corporation, certain British patents under
which British Nylon Spinners (BNS), a non-party British company, held
exclusive licenses and rights to assignment of the patents.52 British Nylon
Spinners sought and obtained an injunction in the United Kingdom
restraining ICI from complying with the American decree. 53 The British
judges emphatically stated that consideration of comity should have
restrained the American court from asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction.54
British legislative reaction to the "effects" doctrine began in 1964 with the
Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act (Shipping Act).55 In
the early 1960s the United States Federal Maritime Commission (Commis-
sion) was investigating the freight rates charged by the member lines of
certain transatlantic shipping conferences. The Commission suspected that
these conferences were restraining trade in the United States. In connection
with this investigation, the Commission requested the production of docu-
mentary evidence that was in the possession of certain British shipping
companies. As a result of public pressure the British Parliament passed the
Shipping Act. This Act authorized certain government officials 56 to pro-
hibit any person in the United Kingdom from complying with a discovery
order of a foreign court, tribunal, or authority that would "constitute an
" 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), relief granted, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). This
case had been labeled the "classic case" of overreaching by some critics. See, e.g., D. Wil-
loughby, Remarks byan English Solicitor in PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLI-
CATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS 61 (J. Griffin ed. 1979); Jennings, supra note 6
at 167-69.
"British Nylon Spinners was jointly owned by ICI and Courtaulds Ltd., another British
corporation.
"British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. [1953] 1 ch. 19 (C.A.
1952).
"
4Lord Denning noted: "Those who expect comity should practice it." Id A jurisdictional
rule of reason analysis, as suggested in Timberlane and Mannington Mfills, would require a
court to balance the interests of the United States against those of other nations, and only if the
United States interests are stronger can the antitrust laws be applied. Presumably the judges
felt that in this situation the British interests of BNS justified restraint in applying United
States antitrust laws.
"Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, ch. 87 [hereinafter cited as
Shipping Act].
"'The Shipping Act lists the following officials as being authorized to make the prohibitions:
"[A] Secretary of State, the President of the Board of Trade, the Minister of Aviation, the
Minister of Power, and the Minister of Transport." 1d § 2(2).
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infringement of the jurisdiction which, under international law, belong to
the United Kingdom."
57
The British soon realized, however, that the Shipping Act was insufficient
to deter United States discovery procedures. 58 For example, in In re
Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, Beechams, one of Great Britain's leading
pharmaceutical producers, was ordered by the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia to produce certain documents. 59 The British Department
of Trade and Industry, relying on the authority vested in it by virtue of the
Shipping Act, ordered Beechams not to produce the sought after docu-
ments. 60 Judge Sirica in the American district court ruled that Beechams
failure to comply with discovery orders warranted the "negative resolution
of facts" sanction under Rule 37(b).6 1 The judge indicated that Beechams
failed to satisfy the court that "it has taken all affirmative steps required to
achieve compliance with the court's discovery orders." 62 The Department
of Trade relented and permitted the production of all documents except
thirty-six which were treated as confidential.
63
In the late 1970s the conflict over the extraterritorial application of the
United States antitrust laws reached new heights in two separate actions
threatening the survival of two of Britain's largest industries: the Westing-
house Uranium case and the Ocean Shipping case.
A. The Westinghouse Uranium Case
64
On October 15, 1976, the Westinghouse Electric Corporation filed suit in
the United States district court for the Northern District of Illinois against
571d § 2(1). Note that § I of the Shipping Act, note 55 supra, applies specifically and solely
to shipping cases.
'"Lord Hacking noted, however that "the last laugh has by no means been with the [Brit-
ish]." The Lord Hacking, The Increasing Extraterritorial Impact of U.S. Laws. A Causefor
Concern Amongst Friends of America in PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICA-
TION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS 155, 164 (J. Griffin ed. 1979).
"M.D.L. Docket No. 50, Civ. No. 822-70 (D.D.C.); see Note, Discovery of Documents
Located Abroad in US Antitrust Litigation.- Recent Developments in the Law Concerning the
Foreign Illegality Excusefor Non-Production, 14 VA. INT'L L.J. 747, 761 (1974).
6°Department of Trade and Industry order reprinted in 595 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) A-5 (Jan. 9, 1973).
"'In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. Docket No. 50, Misc. No. 45-70 (D.D.C.),
Further Order Relating to Failure of Beecham Group Limited to Comply Fully with Discov-
ery Orders, filed May 25, 1973 at 2-3.
621d
"See Minister amends order.- Beecham may now answer U.S. questions, in THE TIMES
(London), Aug. 31, 1973, at 15, col. 1.
'A brief background of this highly complex and controversial topic is necessary. The
Westinghouse litigation encompasses at least twenty-seven separate lawsuits in the United
States and Great Britain. The litigation revolves around uranium, a product widely used
commercially as a constituent element of fuel for the operation of nuclear power stations. The
principal producers of uranium are the United States, Australia, Canada, South Africa and
France. The United States was, during the relevant period, both the largest consumer and the
largest producer of uranium.
In 1964, when its uranium mining industry was threatened by foreign imports, the United
States enacted the Private Ownership of Special Nuclear Materials Act which, inter alia,
protected the interests of United States producers of uranium by banning foreign importations
of uranium for use in domestic reactors. 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v) (1976). This embargo was
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members of an alleged international uranium cartel charging them with
price fixing, market division, refusals to deal with certain uranium purchas-
ers, and other Sherman Act violations.65 Nine foreign defendants refused
to appear before the court, and a default judgment was entered against
them in January 1979.66 On appeal, amici curiae briefs were filed on behalf
of the governments of Australia, Canada, South Africa and the United
Kingdom. The British government's brief presented two jurisdictional
questions: (I) whether subject matter jurisdiction existed; and (2) if it did
exist, whether it should be exercised.
6 7
The British first argued that the extraterritorial application of the United
States antitrust laws was "inconsistent with international law."'68 The brief
quoted from the British government's submission to the House of Lords in
reaffirmed in 1966 by regulation of the Atomic Energy Commission implementing the 1964
Legislation. 31 Fed. Reg. 16,479 (Dec. 23, 1966). These regulations had the effect of denying
to non-United States producers of uranium almost three-fourths of the world market. See
Notes for Editors (British Embassy) (available upon request from the British Embassy); British
Government Brief, supra note 35 at 9. United States companies, on the other hand, continued
to sell uranium outside the United States in direct competition with foreign uranium
producers. In response to the United States protection measures, foreign uranium producers
joined together in an international marketing arrangement, a "cartel," to divide territorially
the non-United States demand.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s the Westinghouse Electric Corporation [hereinafter cited as
Westinghouse] contracted to build nuclear power stations. As an inducement for these
contracts, Westinghouse agreed to supply future orders of uranium for a specified set price
(with a small cost of living escalation clause). Following a large and unexpected rise in the
price of uranium in 1974, Westinghouse notified its customers that it was unable to fulfill the
uranium contracts due to "commercial impracticability." Subsequently, sixteen United States
and three Swedish power utilities brought suit against Westinghouse for breach of contracts.
On October 15, 1976, Westinghouse, in response, brought suit in the Northern District of
Illinois against twenty United States and foreign uranium producers, claiming a violation of
the Sherman Act and alleging that the international cartel caused a lack of supply of uranium
and forced the steep rise in uranium prices. The total amount of treble damages claimed by
Westinghouse is approximately six billion dollars. For further discussion of the proceedings,
see, e.g., The Lord Hacking, The Increasing Extraterritorial Impact of U. S. Laws: A Causefor
Concern Amongst Friends of America in PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS 155 (J. Griffin ed. 1979).
"
5Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Rio Algom, Ltd., No. 76-3940 (N.D. Ill., filed Oct. 15,
1976). Named in the complaint were: Rio Algom Ltd.; Rio Algom Corporation; Rio Tinto
Zinc Corporation Ltd.; RTZ Service, Ltd.; Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation; Conzinc Rio Tinto of
Australia Ltd.; Mary Kathleen Uranium Ltd.; Panocontinental Mining Ltd.; Queensland
Mines Ltd.; Nuclear Fuels Corporation; Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, Ltd.;
Engelhard Minerals and Chemicals Corporation; Denison Mines Ltd.; Noranda Mines Ltd.;
Gulf Oil Corporation; Gulf Mineral Canada Ltd.; Kerr-McGee Corporation; Anaconda Com-
pany; Getty Oil Company; Utah International Inc.; Phelps Dodge Company; Western
Nuclear, Inc.; Homestake Mining Company; Atlas Corporation; Reserve Oil and Minerals
Corporation; United Nuclear Corporation; Federal Resources Corporation; and Pioneer
Nuclear, Inc. Also, the Uranium Institute was named as a co-conspirator along with other
unnamed co-conspirators.
'480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aft'd, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
"
7See British Government Brief, supra note 35 at 7.
681d at 24.
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In re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contracts Litigation, an
ancillary proceeding:69
The application of the effects doctrine is regarded by Her Majesty's Government
as being particularly objectionable in the field of antitrust legislation:
(1) The formation of a cartel and other activities against which anti-trust legis-
lation is directed are not universally recognized as unlawful ...
(2) The assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in anti-trust matters represents
an extension of the economic policy of one state which is likely to conflict with
that of other states.
70
Second, they argued that the effects test as formulated in Alcoa is no longer
accepted by United States courts as "settled law."' 7 1 The British claimed
that a critical discussion of the Alcoa test, as was undertaken in the recent
Timberlane and Mannington Mills decisions, undermined its continuing
viability as the standard of extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Sherman
Act.
7 2
Applying its own version of the Mannington Mills analysis, the appellate
court reviewing the Westinghouse case noted that the district court had con-
sidered these factors: the complexity of the . . . multi-national and multi-
party action; the seriousness of the charges asserted; and the "recalcitrant
attitude of the defaulters. ' 73 The court concluded that, by considering
these factors and determining that jurisdiction should be asserted, the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion, and the judgment was affirmed. 74
However, the court of appeals also concluded that, for reasons of judicial
economy, a hearing on damages based on the default judgment should not
be held until the domestic defendants' liability has been resolved.75 The
Westinghouse trial is scheduled to begin in September 1981.
The flaw in the "rule of reason" analysis attempted by Judge Prentice
Marshall in the Westinghouse case lies in the fact that it is, in reality, not
-[11978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977). Discovery of evidence concerning the existence of a cartel
was relevant to Westinghouse's "commercial impracticability" defense in the contracts litiga-
tion, and was essential to Westinghouse's antitrust action. In October 1976, a federal judge in
Virginia issued letters rogatory to the High Court of Justice in England seeking documents
possessed by Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation (RTZ) and certain RTZ officials. The English Court
of Appeal upheld the letters rogatory, but at the ensuing deposition RTZ officials refused to
testify, asserting the American Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and
refused to produce documents, asserting the British privilege against self-incrimination. The
Justice Department tried to resolve the issue by granting use immunity to the RTZ officials,
but the officials still refused to testify or to produce the documents. The appeal was taken to
the House of Lords, which denied the validity of the letter rogatory.
7 Supra note 35.
"Id. at 23.
1
2The brief quoted John H. Shenefield, then-Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Justice Department's Antitrust Division: "The list of factors suggested [in Timberlane] sug-
gests that parties and the Court must now give consideration to all of the factors that.., have
been argued so vigorously by the foreign parties in past controversies. . . This new role for
the district court is long overdue. ... Remarks by John H. Shenefield, "Extraterritorial
Impact of U.S. Antitrust Laws," before the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Inter-
national Law (Aug. 9, 1978), reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,386, at 55,857.
"Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 617 F.2d 1244, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980).
74Ida
71M. at 1263.
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even similar to the Timberlane-Mannington Mills balancing. Instead of
utilizing the factors recommended by Mannington Mills and Timberlane,
the Westinghouse court "balanced" three aspects of the case which are
clearly biased against the defaulting parties. The entire "considerations of
comity" idea stressed by the Mannington Mills and Timberlane courts was
replaced by the Westinghouse court with its own "balancing test." In effect,
Judge Marshall ignored the "comparative relations" doctrine espoused in
Mannington Mills and Timberlane praised by legal commentators and
reverted to the effects doctrine as enunciated in Alcoa .76
B. The Ocean Shipping Case
The second incident to spark British anger involved the international
shipping industry. In June 1979, a federal grand jury indicted seven Euro-
pean shipping companies for fixing freight rates on container shipments.
77
Included in the indictments were the consortia Atlantic Container Line and
Dart Container Line, which numbered as members the Cunard and Bibby
Shipping Lines of the United Kingdom. 78 All seven shipping companies
pleaded no contest and paid fines totaling $6.1 million (U.S.). 7
9
The fines provoked an angry reaction in Great Britain. In Parliament,
Under-Secretary of Trade Norman Tebbit promised a reappraisal of coop-
eration with the United States on antitrust matters:
Shipping is an international activity, affecting the interests of both countries. Any
questions that arise should therefore be dealt with jointly, and we consider it
wrong in principle for the United States to exercise unilateral control over ship-
ping between the two countries, in disregard both of [British] economic interests
and shipping policies. 80
The major issue in the case was a political, rather than a legal one.
Under the European legal system, shipping lines are free to fix rates on
their routes using the traditional conference system.8 1 In addition, they
may also give discounts to certain customers. 82 British Secretary of Trade
John Nott noted that British anger was primarily directed at the fact that
76See, e.g., Comment, Defense to Actions Against Foreign States Under the United States
Antitrust Laws, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 583, 615-27 (1979); Recent Development, 20 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 667 (1979); Comment, 12 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 503 (1980).




"Id at A-30. During th Parliament's debates on the Trading Interests Act, Trade Secretary
John Nott stressed the reason for the British and, in fact, European system. "The policy of the
British government, along with that of all European governments, has been to avoid detailed
regulatory intervention in the commercial aspects of international shipping. We believe that to
be the best way of achieving efficient and effective shipping services and protecting the interest
of the consumer." 972 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1538 (1979).
82922 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-30 (July 12, 1979).
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the violations of the Sherman Act which attracted the fines would not have
been illegal in the United Kingdom.
83
The importance of these two cases to Great Britain lies in the possible
effects they can have on two of Great Britain's largest industries.84 The
British government noted in its amicus curiae brief to the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in the Westinghouse case:
if Westinghouse through an enormous default judgement in this very controver-
sial case is given a claim which it may seek to enforce against RTZ's [the British
defaulters, Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation Limited and RTZ Services Ltd.] assets, a
major portion of the British-owned mining interests throughout the world may be
in jeopardy. Such a result . . . would unjustifiably and severely injure the gen-
eral economic interests of the United Kingdom, as well as the particular British
companies concerned and their shareholders.
8 5
In addition, the grand jury indictments against the British shipping lines set
off a rash of large private treble damage suits against those lines, and "The
consequences for shipping companies are potentially financially crip-
pling,"'8 6 Secretary Nott said.
IV. The Protection of Trading Interests Act
On September 14, 1979, Nott addressed the British-American Chamber
of Commerce in Los Angeles. In his speech he stated:
I shall be introducing new legislation designed to give better protection to British
companies and individuals against attempts by any other country. . . to impose
on them unilaterally their own domestic economic policies and regulations. One
of the effects of these proposals, if Parliament approves them, will be that a range
of U.S. judgements, including those in antitrust, will not be enforceable in the
United Kingdom.
87
The Protection of Trading Interests Acts, 88 proposed in November 15,
1979 and passed by Parliament on March 20, 1980, is actually an even
harsher measure. It can be divided into three sections: (1) a "discovery"
section, 89 a "nonenforcement" section, 90 and a "clawback" provision.9 1
3
1d
"Some of the other countries involved in the Westinghouse case have even more at stake.
For example, Australia, in its amicus curiae memorandum, noted that:
Australia's export income from minerals and mineral products of 4.7 billion dollars in 1977/
78 represented 39 percent of the total national export income that year .... With regard to
uranium, Australia is on the verge of becoming a major exporter. As of 30 June 1978 the
reasonably assured uranium resources of Australia recoverable at less than $80 per kilogram
represents about 18 percent of the Western world's estimated resources in that category.
Supra note 36 at 5-6.
"British Government Brief, supra note 35 at 5-6.
16972 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1539 (1979).
"Address by Secretary John Nott, British-American Chamber of Commerce in Los Angeles,
California (September 14, 1979) quoted in British Government Brief, supra note 35 at 31-32.




Protection of Trading Interests Act
The discovery section permits the British Secretary of State to prohibit
persons or corporations in the United Kingdom from furnishing commer-
cial information or producing commercial documents to a court, tribunal or
authority in a foreign country. 92 The standard for those decisions is
broadly defined. He may prohibit compliance if he decides that:
a. The requirement to produce documents or information would infringe
the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, or is otherwise prejudicial to the
security of the United Kingdom.93
b. Compliance with the requirement would be prejudicial to the security
of the United Kingdom or to the relations of the government of the United
Kingdom with the government of any other country (emphasis supplied).94
c. The requirement is made for purposes other than for civil or criminal
proceedings which have been instituted in the overseas country. 95
d. The requirement is upon persons or corporations in the United King-
dom not to produce the documents, but merely to state which of the docu-
ments are in their possession.96
The discovery section is not novel legislation. As was mentioned previ-
ously, the Shipping Act authorized government officials to prohibit com-
pliance with foreign discovery orders which would "constitute an
infringement of the jurisdiction which, under international law, belongs to
the United Kingdom. '97 However, the discovery provision in the Trading
Interests Act broadens and strengthens the powers of the Secretary. Under
the Shipping Act, the government officials were authorized to prohibit com-
pliance with requests for documents or requests for "commercial informa-
tion to be compiled from documents" only if the requests would constitute
an infringement of United Kingdom jurisdiction under principles of inter-
national law.98 Under the Trading Interests Act, the Secretary is author-
ized to prohibit compliance with a broader range of requests for some





" Id § 2(3)(a).
Id § 2(3)(b).
"See notes 55 to 63 & accompanying text supra.
"Shipping Act, supra note 55, § 2(1). Note that the discovery provisions in the Trading
Interests Act apply solely to the Secretary of the State while the Shipping Act authorizes five
government officials to take the necessary action. Id § 2(2).
"During the debates in the House of Lords, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, one of the sponsors
of the Act, emphasized that:
Itlhe 1964 Act (Shipping Act) has been reasonably effective here, but time has shown that it
was not wide enough. We have reached the conclusion that we should be able to control the
production of documents from the United Kingdom in any circumstances except those in
which, if the application were made through our courts, those courts would order production
under the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975 as a matter of course.
404 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 561 (1980).
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ance with any pretrial discovery order for the sole reason that the order is
pretrial. 100
The nonenforcement section provides that "no court in the United King-
dom shall entertain proceedings at common law for the recovery of any
sum payable under [a judgment awarding multiple damages or any trade
regulation or antitrust judgment]."10t The British feel that this is merely a
codification of existing policy. In fact, British courts have generally refused
to enforce United States multiple damage awards "either on the grounds
that such awards are penalties or that enforcement would be contrary to
(British) public policy." 10 2 In a diplomatic note to the State Department,
the British Embassy noted that "Clause 5 (the nonenforcement provision)
clarifies a question of U.K. law. .... ,,103 However, the provision does pro-
vide statutory means by which United States treble-damage antitrust judg-
ments can be automatically avoided. In addition, as was stressed in a note
from the United States to the British, the clause is a direct affront to the
United States-United Kingdom Convention on Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Judgments in Civil Matters' 4 which would "contemplate enforce-
ment of the compensatory portion of [a multiple damage award]." 105 Most
important, this provision provides further evidence of a trend among the
United States' foreign allies toward the worldwide nonenforcement of
American antitrust decisions. 10 6 For example, on March 15, 1979, the Aus-
tralian Federal Parliament enacted the Foreign Antitrust Judgement
(Restrictions of Enforcement) Act 1979 which, much like the nonenforce-
ment provision in the Trading Interests Act, renders antitrust judgments of
foreign courts unenforceable in Australia.' 0 7 Similar legislation has been
enacted in South Africa. '0 8
The bulk of the controversy revolving around the Trading Interests Act
has involved clause six, commonly called the "claw-back" provision. A
novel idea, clause six provides that where a foreign court has given a judg-
ment and multiple damage award against a citizen of the United Kingdom,
a corporation incorporated in the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, or
any person "carrying on business in the United Kingdom," a "qualifying
defendant" may, in a British court, recover back from the "multiple-dam-
'"Trading Interests Act, supra note I § 2(3)(a).
'ld § 5(1), (2).
0°2404 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 561-62 (1980). Lord Mackay of Clashfern noted, however,
that the case of Huntington v. Atrill cast some doubt on this judicial policy. See note 23 supra
& accompanying text.
'
0 3British Embassy, Note No. 225 to U.S. Dep't of State (November 27, 1979) [hereinafter
cited as British Note].
045 INT. LEGAL MATERIALS 636 (1966).
'United States Embassy, Note No. 56, to British Secretary of State for Foreign and Com-
monwealth Affairs 4 (November 9, 1979) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Note]. Negotiation on this
point in the convention has been underway since 1971.
"°
4See notes 121 to 123 & accompanying text infra.
1'7Foreign Antitrust Judgements (Restriction of Enforcement) Act, No. 13, Austl. Acts
(1979).
08. African Law. Protection of Businesses Act, No. 99 (1978).
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age award" winner the entire noncompensatory portion of the award.' 0 9
The claim may be made even if the award winner is not within the jurisdic-
tion of the British court, 0 so the "clawback" threat might prevent the
award winner from establishing operations in Great Britain.
The only "qualifying defendants" who may not initiate a "claw-back"
proceeding are individuals who are "ordinarily resident" in the foreign
country in which the multiple damage award was givenI and those who
"carried on business in the overseas country and the proceedings in which
the judgement was given were concerned with activities exclusively carried
on in that country."' 1 2 This will prevent American treble damage losers
and those foreigners who fall within the "territorial" application of United
States antitrust laws from taking advantage of the British "claw-back" pro-
vision; however, the remaining "qualifying defendants" still constitute a
large number of foreign litigants.
In order to adequately analyze the potential effects of the Trading Inter-
ests Act, it is helpful to apply the Act hypothetically to, for example, the
Westinghouse proceedings. The major advantage of the Act is the conven-
ience it provides for the government officials involved. For example, had
the "discovery" provision of the Trading Interests Act been applied to the
controversial and technical discovery controversy in the Westinghouse case,
the House of Lords would not have been forced to resort to questionable
reasoning in order to deny Westinghouse's discovery requests.' 13 Under
the Trading Interests Act, the Secretary of State would have prohibited
compliance with the discovery orders extrajudicially on the premise that the
orders or compliance with the orders would be prejudicial to the security of
the United Kingdom. In addition, if the Westinghouse court awards a
treble damage judgment to Westinghouse, the nine defaulting foreign
defendants, including the non-British defendants, can all go to a British
court and bring "claw-back" actions in Great Britain to recover the non-
compensatory aspects of the treble damage awards. Finally, these treble
damage awards would be unenforceable in the United Kingdom.
The "claw-back" provision provoked an immediate reaction. It sparked
long parliamentary debates in both the House of Lords and the House of
Commons."l 4 The United States ambassador to Great Britain, in a diplo-
matic note to the British Secretary of State, stated:
We are seriously concerned by Clause 6, both in overall concept and in specific
details. As far as we are aware, this provision has no precedent anywhere in the




2 d § 6(4).
"
3 See note 69 supra.
"4See 972 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1533-91 (1979);see 404 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 554-
97 (1980).
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world. In our view, it raises serious questions under the very principles of inter-
national law and comity to which Her Majesty's Government is committed.15
Despite the international law implications, during the Parliamentary
debates on the Trading Interests Act the strongest argument against adop-
tion of the Act was that it would not succeed in deterring the American
courts from acting extraterritorially against British interests." 1 6 One mem-
ber of the House of Lords expressed the fear that United States defendants
to "claw-back" proceedings would remove all assets from Great Britain
before they could be attached." 7 However, Douglas Rosenthal, the former
head of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division's Foreign Commerce
Section noted that the proposal "could have a significant impact on a small
number of cases," and that the potential seizure of assets of American com-
panies is "a serious business."' 18
A. Could the Act Have Been Prevented?
In 1953, Justice Jackson prophetically warned the United States judici-
ary:
In dealing with international commerce we cannot be unmindful of the necessity
for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be avoided; nor should we forget that
any contact which we hold sufficient to warrant application of our laws to a for-
eign transaction will logically be as strong a warrant for a foreign country to
apply its law to an American transaction. 119
Unfortunately, certain courts have been unmindful of Jackson's stated
"necessity" and the result is retaliation. The cure is not a simple one; how-
ever, a strict application of the Timberlane-Mannington Mills balancing test
and other foreign compulsion defenses is a step in the right direction. Com-
mentators have stressed the fact that international law supports the adop-
tion of a comparative relations analysis to decide the applicability of the
Sherman Act to extraterritorial conduct. 120 A comparative relations test
such as the one adopted by Judge Marshall in the Westinghouse case, only
serves to exacerbate the situation.
B. Relevance of the Act.- The Past and the Future
The Protection of Trading Interests Act illustrates clearly a strong and
determined campaign by the British and other governments to end the
widespread extraterritorial action applications of law that United States
courts have exercised in the past. At least ten foreign countries have
enacted "counterlegislation" against the extraterritorial application of for-
eign competition law to matters which they view as coming under their soV-
"'U.S. Note, supra note 105 at 4.
"'See 404 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 568 (1980).
"'Associated Press, Dec. 19, 1979.
"'Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953).
2
'See note 76.
Protection of Trading Interests Act 229
ereignty.121 Australia and South Africa have enacted nonenforcement of
judgments laws.122 France has been the most recent addition to the group
of countries that have enacted "discovery" measures. 123 "Claw-back" pro-
visions are being discussed by several foreign governments. This trend
indicates the frustration felt by foreign governments in fighting the extrater-
ritorial antitrust idea in cases such as In reAmpicillin Antitrust Litigation. 124
The results of the Westinghouse and Shipping Conference cases could prove
economically tragic to numerous foreign countries and, predictably, their
frustration has turned to anger.
A clear illustration of the British position was expressed by Under-Secre-
tary Tebbit during the House of Commons debates: "The late Sir Winston
Churchill said that jaw-jaw was better than war-war. For years we tried
jaw-jaw. We have now been driven to law-law."' 125
The crucial question in analyzing this Act is whether "law-law" is an
alternative, even a reluctant alternative, to "jaw-jaw." While introducing
the act in Parliament, Secretary Nott quoted from an American newspaper
and may have inadvertently answered this question: "Maintaining interna-
tional competition is the proper business of diplomats and negotiation, not
federal judges and litigation." 126 Using laws to undo another country's leg-
islation is entirely contrary to principles of comity and international coop-
eration. However, one member of the House of Lords did proffer a possible
solution to this issue. He said, ". . . the introduction of this bill should not
prevent further efforts by discussion and agreement between our two coun-
tries."1 27 This writer would agree.
2
'By 1970, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, India, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden and the United Kingdom had passed one form or another of "counter-legislation"
against the extraterritorial application of foreign competition law to matters which they view
as coming under their sovereignty. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE
FIFTY-FOURTH CONFERENCE AT THE HAGUE 178 (1970).
'
22See notes 107-8, supra.
'See text of French law in Appendix A, infra.
"See notes 59-63, supra.
'"See 972 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1591 (1979).
6 Id at 1543. Nott was quoting from the Wash. Post, Nov. 4, 1979, § C at 6.
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Le titre de la loi no 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968 relative A la communication de
documents et renseignements A des autorit~s 6trang~res dans le domaine du com-
merce maritime, est modifi ainsi qu'il suit :
<< Loi relative A la communication de documents et renseignements d'ordre
6conomique, commercial, industriel, financier ou technique A des personnes phy-
siques ou morales 6trang~res. o
Art. 2.
I. - L'article premier de la. loi no 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968 susvis6e est ainsi
r~dig6 :
<<Art. premier. - Sous r6serve des traites ou accords internationaux, il est interdit
a toute personne physique de nationalit6 franqaise ou r~sidant habituellement sur le
territoire franqais et A tout dirigeant, repr6sentant, agent ou pr~pos6 d'une personne
morale y ayant son siege ou un 6tablissement, de communiquer par 6crit, oralement
ou sous toute autre forme, en quelque lieu que ce soit, A des autorit6s publiques
6trang~res, les documents ou les renseignements d'ordre 6conomique, commercial,
industriel, financier ou technique dont la communication est de nature A porter
atteinte A la souverainet6, A la scurit6, aux int6rets 6conomiques essentiels de la
France ou A l'ordre public, pr6cists par l'autorit6 administrative en tant que de
besoin. )
II. - I1 est insr6, apr~s rarticle premier de la loi no 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968
susvis~e, un article premier bis ainsi r~dig6 :
< Art. premier bis. - Sous r6serve des trait6s ou accords internationaux et des lois
et r~glements en vigueur, il est interdit A toute personne de demander, de rechercher
ou de communiquer, par 6crit, oralement ou sous toute autre forme, des documents
ou renseignements d'ordre 6conomique, commercial, industriel, financier ou tech-
nique, tendant A la constitution de preuves en vue de procedures judiciaires ou
administratives 6trang~res ou dans le cadre de celles-ci.
Art. 3.
L'article 2 de la loi no 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968 susvis~e est ainsi modifi:
<(Art. 2. - Les personnes vis~es aux articles premier et premier bis sont tenues
d'informer sans d~lai le ministre competent lorsqu'elles se trouvent saisies de toute
demande concernant de telles communications.,
Voir les numeros :
Senat: 469 (1978-1979), 210 et in-8e 67 (1979-1980).
Assembl6e nationale (6e lgisl.): 1771, 1814 Ct in 8e 324.
Transports a~riens. - Transports maritimes.
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Art. 4.
L'article 3 de la loi n0 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968 prcitee est ainsi modifi:
< Art. 3. - Sans prejudice des peines plus lourdes prevues par la loi, toute infrac-
tion aux dispositions des articles premier et premier bis de la prdsente loi sera punie
d'un emprisonnement de deux mois A six mois et d'une amende de 10.000 F A
120.000 F ou de l'une de ces deux peines sculement. >
Dklibr en sbancepublique, d Paris, le 24juin 1980.
Le President,
Sign4: JACQUES CHABAN-DELMAS.
Imprimerie du Senat.
